Tensions are likely to persist across the Taiwan Strait in the coming months following US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and China’s unprecedented military exercises around the island. The Aug. 4-8 exercises allowed branches of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to perform joint operations at a large scale, fully demonstrating the progress China’s military has made after two decades of dedicated modernization. The exercises also served as an opportunity to practice a blockade of Taiwan, a tactic that Beijing hopes would compel Taipei to capitulate in a future standoff over the island’s status in lieu of a direct conflict.
Chinese leaders fear that the government in Taipei, emboldened by demonstrations of support from the US, Taiwan’s main defense supplier, will declare independence. Such concerns have been accentuated by US President Joe Biden’s alleged rhetorical gaffes that the US would defend Taiwan if a conflict occurred, a departure from a previous, more ambiguous US policy. Although Biden administration officials have routinely walked back the president’s statements, it undoubtedly sowed mistrust of US intentions in Beijing. Additionally, Taiwan has been able to build limited international support in recent years as major power relations are increasingly framed as a competition between autocracy and democracy. In this context, China’s decision to conduct the exercises underscores the severity of the perceived provocation from Speaker Pelosi’s visit. As the most senior US government member to visit Taiwan in 25 years and second in presidential succession, Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan prompted the need for a mass symbolic display to deter more enhanced engagement from the US and other Western governments.
Despite Beijing’s anger over the visit, the PLA announced and specified the areas of the operation, measures intended to reduce the probability of an accident that could result in conflict. The PLA also did not enter Taiwan’s territorial waters, which could have prompted a response from Taiwan’s military or defense supporters. The exercises did result in some flight cancellations as they began, and some airlines and maritime traffic altered their routes during the exercises, but significant disruptions were limited and short-lived. In Taiwan, the PLA maneuvers did not impact day-to-day operations or local transport networks.
Beyond the military drills, China launched dozens of cyberattacks against Taiwan targets following Pelosi’s visit and announced import bans for some agricultural products. Both measures are largely symbolic, though China likely possesses the ability to carry out significant and disruptive cyberattacks in Taiwan. Meanwhile, less than one percent of Taiwan’s exports to mainland China are agricultural products. While further import bans are possible, a major escalation in economic punishment for Taiwan is unlikely. Chinese factories require Taiwan for semiconductors and chips to fuel electronics manufacturing in the country. Additionally, economic growth in mainland China has slowed significantly in 2022 as the government’s ongoing zero-COVID pandemic approach has forced lockdowns in major production centers and interrupted shipping. Therefore, Beijing is unlikely to introduce unnecessary disruptions to vital supply chains.
However, Pelosi’s visit and the subsequent military exercises have marginally altered the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Incursions across the so-called median line, an observed but not legal maritime demarcation halfway between mainland China and Taiwan, have occasionally occurred in recent years amid a rapid rise in PLA flight operations in the Taiwan Strait. During the August military exercises, PLA aircraft and ships crossed the boundary daily. More concerning, Chinese military analysts were widely reported stating that the PLA would continue to conduct drills east of the median line going forward. While not inherently provocative, conducting patrols and exercises closer to Taiwan raises the prospect of an accident or miscalculation that could quickly escalate into a greater conflict. It remains unclear if Chinese officials will routinely operate in these waters or use exercises across the median line to express displeasure for more moderate Taiwan or US provocations. The Taiwan Policy Act, a bill in the US Congress that would designate Taiwan a major non-NATO US ally and provide USD 4.5 billion in defense assistance, might again provoke Chinese action in the Taiwan Strait.
Yet, military to military combat in the Taiwan Strait remains unlikely. China is only legally obligated to reunify Taiwan militarily if the island’s government declares independence. Even amid escalating rhetoric, leaders in Beijing have frequently reiterated that it prefers a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue. The statements suggest that Beijing’s fundamental calculation of the benefit of taking Taiwan by force has not changed. While few observers doubt China’s ability to take Taiwan, it is less clear what cost the Chinese government is willing to pay for reunification, as a quick victory remains uncertain. The PLA remains untested in a combat situation, and the 180 km (110 miles) Taiwan Strait also makes most PLA assets a target for its adversaries. Taiwan continues to invest in its own defense through weapons purchases and scaling up its domestic missile production. Therefore, the cost to mainland China’s economy and military materiel will remain a significant deterrent to an unprovoked attack on Taiwan for the foreseeable future.
Crisis24 provides in-depth intelligence, planning, and training, as well as swift and actionable responses to keep your organization ahead of emerging risks. Contact us to learn more.
