Since November 2023, the Al-Houthi movement has presented a significant threat to shipping in the Red Sea. The group, which pledged solidarity with Palestinians following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attack in southern Israel and the subsequent Israeli response, stated that it would target all Israeli and US-linked ships in the region. Approximately 100 ships have since been struck in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, with two sunk. Vessels with no clear ties to Israel have also been damaged in Al-Houthi strikes. The attacks have disrupted Red Sea shipping operations and prompted companies to consider alternative routes. As a result, shipping traffic through the Suez Canal has been reduced by approximately 70 percent.
In reaction, Western countries launched Operation Prosperity Guardian in December 2023; a US-led coalition of 20 nations sharing intelligence and providing naval vessels to defend neutral shipping. Naval forces have attacked Al-Houthi missile facilities in Yemen as part of this operation.
At-a-Glance: Key Takeaways
- While the current escalation in the Middle East is unlikely to significantly change the situation in the Red Sea, rumored talks between Russia and Al-Houthis over arms deals threaten to prolong and intensify the crisis.
- Following a period of silence for almost all of September, Al-Houthi strikes on shipping operations in the Red Sea resumed in October.
- Russia is considering providing more advanced, faster, and longer-range Yahkont missiles to Al-Houthi, which would lead to an increased threat to shipping and increased military escalation.
The Cyclical Nature of Al-Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea
Typically, Al-Houthi attacks occur in a cycle, with weeks of near-daily attacks followed by a period of relative quiet - extended periods of silence do not necessarily indicate that the Al-Houthis have been weakened, however. Following the longest period without attacks – lasting for almost all of September – Al-Houthi strikes resumed in October. The resumption was likely linked to Israel’s bombing of Yemen’s Port of Al-Hudaydah, the killing of Lebanese Hizballah (LH) leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the launch of Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon.
There are several possible reasons for the extended lull in September.
- The Al-Houthis may have paused to allow the salvage of the Sounion to proceed, which had been on fire and drifting since Aug. 22 following a series of Al-Houthi strikes and was threatening to cause a major environmental catastrophe should its cargo of oil leak.
- It is possible that US, UK, and Israeli air strikes have had an impact on Al-Houthi capabilities – though the group has shown itself to be remarkably resilient to such strikes over the course of the year as well as throughout the Yemeni Civil War.
- The relative calm in the Red Sea could be linked to the possibility that the Al-Houthis were stockpiling weapons to launch a new phase of attacks in the region.
- The reason may simply be that most companies at risk of being targeted are now avoiding the Red Sea.
The Al-Houthis will likely aim to escalate their attacks in retaliation for recent Israeli operations against LH and Iran. However, this is unlikely to be in the form of a significant increase in attacks in the Red Sea due to a dearth of suitable targets, limitations imposed by the weaponry currently available, and the presence of international forces in the region. Any escalation is more likely to take the form of an increase of attempted strikes on Israel itself, especially on targets in and around Eilat and central Israel.
The Impact of a Russian Arms Deal
While events in the wider Middle East region may not significantly affect the current situation in the Red Sea, the threat to maritime shipping may increase further. In September, reports suggested that Russia is considering arming the Al-Houthis with advanced P-800 Onyx (also known under its export designation Yakhont) anti-ship missiles. It is possible that Russia would consider exporting anti-ship missiles to the Al-Houthis as retaliation for Western countries allowing Ukraine to use their cruise missiles to strike targets in Russian territory. Moscow has previously exported the Yakhont weapon system to Syria, which in turn likely supplied it to LH, likely with Russian assent; there is therefore precedent for an export to the Al-Houthis.
The presence of Yakhont missiles in Yemen would cause significant concern amongst the Western navies currently active in the Red Sea. The missile is more advanced, faster, and has a longer range than other weapons in the Al-Houthi arsenal, and would pose a greater threat both to neutral shipping and the warships in the region.
The missiles would need commensurate infrastructure including targeting radars and command and control facilities, which in turn would be vulnerable to US-led strikes if the Al-Houthis attempted to use them. The Al-Houthis’ relative success in recent years has come in part from using relatively lower-technology and easier to disguise weapons systems. In any event, if Russia does export the Yakhont system to the region, it would lead to an increased threat to shipping and increased military escalation.
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