Myanmar: Armed clashes between military and anti-regime groups likely to persist nationwide through at least January /update 10

The instability that emerged following Myanmar's Feb. 2021 military coup is likely to continue affecting the country through at least early January. The nation remains in a state of emergency through at least Jan. 31. The conflict between the military troops (Tatmadaw) and the National Unity Government's (NUG) People's Defense Force (PDF), as well as several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), has resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people and the displacement of more than a million others. While some nations, like the US, continue to warn their citizens to avoid travel to Myanmar, several other countries, such as the UK, warn their citizens to avoid all or nonessential travel to conflict zones, mainly in northern Myanmar.

Three resistance groups launched a coordinated offensive - colloquially referred to as Operation 1027 - Oct. 27 by intensifying attacks initially in northern Shan State. The offensive has since spread to several surrounding areas in Myanmar's north and western parts, including the Shan, Kayin, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, Bago states, and Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magway regions. Resistance forces have repeatedly targeted various military installations, regime-controlled villages, security checkpoints, and major interstate highways. Further escalated clashes are anticipated across multiple states and regions over the coming weeks, including areas near border checkpoints with Bangladesh, China, India, and Thailand. Although the groups have focused on territorial gains in the Kokang Region, expansion of operations to other areas with the support of additional outfits is probable in the coming days. Utility disruptions, security curbs, and security operations pose a risk of incidental harm to civilians, and business disruptions may occur at short notice nationwide.

Armed Clashes

Tatmadaw troops clash with various EAOs and PDF units in several parts of Myanmar. As of early December, Operation 1027 has displaced over 350,000 people and caused significant disruptions to ground, air, and land border transits in affected areas. Martial law is indefinitely active in at least eight townships of the worst impacted Shan State as of Dec. 6. The regime has responded with accelerated airstrikes and artillery bombardments and remains capable of preventing large attacks in urban centers. Since 2021, fighting has generally remained the most intense in the country's eastern and northern areas, particularly in the following locations:

• Bago Region: Kyaukkyi and Mone townships.

• Chin State: Falam, Hakha, Kanpetlet, Matupi, Mindat, and Paletwa townships.

• Kachin State: Hpakant, Mohnyin, Momauk, and Shweku townships.

• Kayah State: Bawlake, Demoso, Hpasawng, Hpruso, Loikaw, Maese, and Shadow townships.

• Kayin State: Kawkareik and Myawaddy townships.

• Magway Region: Magway, Myaing, Pakokku, Pauk, Taungdwingyi, and Yesagyo townships.

• Mon State: Kyaikto, Thaton, and Ye townships.

• Rakhine State: Northern regions, including Buthidaung, Kyauktaw, Maungdaw, Minbya, Pauktaw, Ponnagyun, and Rathedaung townships.

• Sagaing Region: Indaw, Kale, Khin-u, Monywa, Myin-mu, Chaung-U, Pale, Salingyi, Shwebo, and Yinmabin townships.

• Shan State: Kokang Self-Administered Zone, Kutkai, Kyaukme, Lashio, Mabein, Muse, Namhkam, and Pekon townships.

• Tanintharyi Region: Palaw and Thayetchaung townships.

PDF command structures and training have improved, and PDF fighters often attack pro-regime forces and installations. The military usually responds to PDF attacks with artillery and airstrikes to target the armed group's members or villages thought to shelter the fighters. Junta authorities also provide funding and equipment to militias to combat PDF units and other anti-regime groups. Heightened security deployment and measures such as checkpoints and inspections are likely near government buildings, premises of businesses and/or individuals perceived to be pro-junta, financial and educational institutions, religious sites, and security installations in major cities.

Authorities will almost certainly maintain heightened security, including checkpoints and road closures, in areas where fighting occurs. Violence will also likely impact transport, especially along roads connecting townships. Authorities may cut internet and telecommunication services in areas where fighting has intensified. Officials may also impose or tighten curfews on short notice in the regions that experience an increase in armed clashes.

Anti-regime groups have staged bombings and assassinations of junta members or people considered to support the Tatmadaw; they have also sabotaged military and other government facilities in various urban areas, including Yangon, Bago, and Mandalay. Both sides have either deliberately and/or inadvertently targeted critical infrastructure sites. Additionally, some activists have targeted individuals, organizations, and facilities owned by foreign nationals from China and other countries that allegedly support the Tatmadaw. While some explosions in urban areas have caused collateral damage and civilian casualties, most attacks are small-scale and inflict limited injuries and property damage. The blasts will likely continue across Myanmar, possibly prompting authorities to impose heightened security measures, resulting in localized disruptions at the incident sites.

Civil Unrest

Pro-democracy activists continue to hold sporadic demonstrations against the Tatmadaw in major urban centers, such as Yangon and Mandalay. Internet service restrictions have repeatedly delayed the reporting of related rallies. Protest activity often spikes over holidays and other significant dates, such as scheduled court hearings involving cases against National League for Democracy (NLD) leaders. Rallies will likely continue nationwide, especially near government buildings, monuments, and public squares. Military and police personnel may use force, including water cannons, tear gas, rubber bullets, and/or live ammunition, to disperse demonstrators; reports indicate regime forces have also previously arrested non-violent demonstrators since February 2021. Activists often block roadways near demonstration sites to limit the mobility of military personnel.

Disruptions

Utility disruptions and damage to infrastructure have occurred nationwide. Power outages are occurring in several cities; supply suspensions for at least four hours daily are reported in industrial zones of Yangon. Electricity disruptions can result in the temporary unavailability of essential services, such as ATMs, petrol stations, and internet and mobile data, as well as commercial and transport disruptions. Intermittent fuel shortages due to import and distribution challenges have also affected Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Yangon since late November, prompting unavailability at refilling stations and the closure of some local factories.

Civilians and militant groups opposed to the Tatmadaw may target telecommunications infrastructure, potentially causing localized disruptions. Additionally, armed clashes near border checkpoints, especially near Thailand, may result in temporary shipping and transport-related disruptions.