10 Jan 2024 | 02:45 PM UTC
Mozambique: Militant threat likely to remain elevated in northern provinces as of early January /update 5
As of early January, militant threat likely to remain elevated in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa provinces, Mozambique.
As of Jan. 10, the militant threat in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa will likely remain elevated in the coming months. The Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a (ASWJ) Islamist militant group continues to operate in northern Mozambique, regularly carrying out attacks in the Macomia and Mocimboa da Praia districts of Cabo Delgado province. While attacks have subsided in recent months, and no direct civilian casualties were reported in the neighboring provinces of Nampula and Niassa through 2023, their presence has prevented authorities from providing administrative, social, and health services for the population returning following displacement.
Violence could resume at short notice. Authorities will undoubtedly maintain an increased security posture in the affected areas of Cabo Delgado and may erect roadblocks or restrict access on some roads. Security-related operations could result in localized ground transport disruptions. Increased vehicle checks are also likely on roads leading to and from larger urban centers. The military presence will continue for the duration of the threat.
Consider deferring nonessential travel to Cabo Delgado until government forces manage to stabilize the security landscape. Proceed with extreme caution when traveling in the Niassa and Nampula provinces. Maintain contact with diplomatic representations. Liaise with trusted security partners for further information. Travel in convoy after a full security review of the route and avoid all travel after dark. Review and update contingency plans. Carry personal identification documents. Heed all security personnel instructions.
Mozambique's northern provinces, particularly Cabo Delgado Province, have been subject to a continuous Islamist insurgency since October 2017. The attacks are linked to militants from Ansar al-Sunna, also known as Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a (ASWJ), and appear to have been originally motivated by an international Islamist agenda. ASWJ pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS), which has reportedly provided weapons, funding, and training to the militants. Attacks peaked in 2022, spreading to the neighboring Nampula and Niassa provinces, and targeting military, industrial, and civilian complexes. As of January 2024, the insurgency has reportedly killed around 6,800 people and displaced around a million more since its inception. Recent developments have reportedly enabled some 300,000 displaced populations to return to northern Mozambique.
Through 2023, the group’s reported attacks significantly decreased. Starting in March 2023 after Cyclone Freddy hit northern Mozambique twice, which probably forced the militants to halt their activities, and following the month of Ramadan in April 2023, attacks were limited to Cabo Delgado. The decline in attacks is largely attributable to the involvement of foreign troops provided by Mozambique’s neighbors. The Mozambican armed forces (FADM) had proven unsuccessful in preventing the growth of militant cells, lacking numbers and coordination to retain control of the area. The support of local militias in late 2022 sparked severe disagreements between the militias and armed forces, and increased tensions within the FADM. Foreign assistance began with the deployment of some 1,900 soldiers from the Southern African Development Community (SADC)'s Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) in July 2021, and an additional 2,800 soldiers from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) in December 2022. Combined, the SAMIM, RDF, and FADM have been able to secure major highways and ports and force militants to retreat further into the forests.
However, the militants have proven resilient, adopting guerilla tactics and jeopardizing ground travel routes, especially around Mocimboa da Praia and Macomia. Militants operate in relatively autonomous cells, and their self-reliance contributes to the difficulty the government has had in tracking down and identifying their support networks. Recent developments also suggest that the insurgency could be socio-economically motivated: ASWJ claims to defend the local rural population against the central government and its allies in a large-scale recruitment campaign dubbed "hearts and minds" amongst rural populations. The campaign has provided the group with a measure of favor, now proving capable of retaining control of small villages. While not controlling large areas, militants have, for the first time in 2023, demonstrated the ability to use remote-controlled Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), posing a permanent threat to overland travel. In addition, though ASWJ's modus operandi does not typically threaten foreign nationals – typically attacking local militias, security forces, and remote towns through road ambushes and armed assaults – assaults against mining operations have sporadically occurred. The latest attack threatening foreigners occurred in February 2023 in the village of Nairoto in Cado Delgado Province, prompting the precautionary evacuation of personnel from the nearby mining camp of Nairoto Resources Limitada.
As of early 2024, their presence continues to destabilize the province, preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching displaced populations, compromising foreign investment, and complicating governance. Foreign investors are evaluating resuming drilling operations off the coast after pausing efforts in 2021, with a view to exporting gas from the northern port of Palma as soon as 2024 should its reconstruction proceed uninterrupted. While ASWJ has not demonstrated capabilities for attacks at sea since 2021, its capacity to raid convoys or attack ore, oil, and gas mining compounds could be cause for concern that it could acquire the means to threaten maritime transport in the near future. In addition, Mozambique is set to hold its general election in October 2024. While ASWJ does not harbor direct political aspirations, militants could capitalize on popular discontent in Cabo Delgado to find greater favor amongst locals. And, should the polls generate disruptive protests akin to those that followed the 2023 municipal elections, ASWJ could capitalize on distracted security services to carry out larger attacks. The security threat could further increase should the SAMIM force’s deployment not be extended beyond July 2024, as while the RDF has not announced any plans to depart, the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) alone will likely not be able to offer the same level of security as it did with its partners.
Various foreign governments are maintaining travel advisories against travel to Cabo Delgado and restricting travel in certain areas of Niassa and Nampula.
