Further escalation and retaliatory strikes are likely between Ukraine and Russia in the coming weeks.
Further escalation and retaliatory strikes are likely between Ukraine and Russia in the coming weeks. On Nov. 17, US President Joe Biden authorized Ukraine to use the US-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) against targets on Russian soil. Within 24 hours, Kyiv used these long-range precision missiles to strike targets in the Bryansk and Kursk regions. Ukrainian forces also used UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike targets in the Kursk region. Officials in Moscow denounced this decision as escalating the conflict, as did allies of US President-elect Trump. The Russian government subsequently claimed to have fired a new Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) in a retaliatory strike on Ukrainian infrastructure near Dnipro on Nov. 21. Moscow may also respond by conducting covert operations against UK and US interests.
A Strategic Shift: US & UK Authorize the Use of Advanced Weapons Systems on Russian Soil
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Western governments have attempted to support Ukraine militarily while avoiding escalation with Moscow. Thus, the US, UK, and France recently only allowed Kyiv to use the most advanced weapon systems, such as ATACMS, Storm Shadow, and SCALP, on Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory. This ceded operational advantage to Moscow, as Russian forces could position their command and control (C2) and logistics centers (targets against which such missile systems are optimized) on Russian territory. President Biden has likely granted this new authority in response to mounting territorial gains by Russian ground forces in recent months, and the strategic unpredictability of the coming Trump presidency.
Washington and London have not revealed details of the constraints set on Kyiv for the use of these missiles on Russian territory. It is also unclear whether France will permit its SCALP missiles to be used. Similarly, it is unclear if US and UK permissions for such strikes will continue into the next US presidency starting Jan. 20.
Recent Russian Air Strikes
On Nov. 17, Russian forces launched one of the conflict’s largest air strikes against Ukraine. Over 200 missiles and drones struck targets in Kyiv and other centers, killing at least 20 people. While the attack came before the White House’s official statement on ATACMS later that day, the announcement had been forecast in US media.
On Nov. 21, Moscow launched an Oreshnik IRBM at Ukrainian positions near Dnipro as part of a larger air strike. IRBMs have a range of multiple thousands of miles and were originally designed to carry nuclear warheads, though clearly, one was not used in this instance. Ukrainian forces have no effective defense against the hypersonic re-entry speed of such IRBMs. Officials in Moscow stated that the Oreshnik missile attack was a warning against further use of Western missiles on Russian territory. They also noted that Washington had been warned of the IRBM launch through nuclear risk reduction channels.
Further Escalation Between Russia and Ukraine
Moscow and Kyiv are likely to launch further large-scale missile and drone attacks in the coming weeks as both sides seek maximum operational advantage before Trump is inaugurated. Kyiv is likely concerned about Trump’s future political and military support for Ukraine and his concept for a peace settlement. Ukrainian forces will likely seek to disrupt Russian C2 and logistics to slow infantry advances. However, the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow may provoke additional Russian IRBM and other mass missile and drone attacks, further degrading Ukraine’s critical infrastructure.
Moscow’s response to the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow may also include reprisals against UK and US interests. Actions may include hybrid or sub-threshold operations, including state-sponsored cyber-attacks or sabotage, such as arson targeting defense contractors. Russian agencies may employ proxies to carry out such activity to maintain deniability. Although little evidence is available, various security incidents across Western Europe may be examples of Russian-backed hybrid activity; it is possible that security-related threats and disruptions may escalate in the coming weeks. Multiple Western embassies in Kyiv, including the US, Italian, and Spanish embassies, were temporarily closed on Nov. 20 in response to an unspecified security threat: this may have been linked to the forewarned Oreshnik firing, or to some other potential targeted retaliation.
Since the first strikes into Russia and Moscow’s Oreshnik IRBM reprisal, Kyiv has fired additional ATACMS salvoes at military targets in Kursk on Nov. 23 and 25. Moscow launched a further mass drone strike on Ukraine overnight, Nov. 25-26, and claims to be preparing further responses as of Nov. 26. The potential escalation will take finely judged political decisions in Kyiv and Washington in the coming days. Russia may further escalate by firing an IRBM fitted with conventional warheads or by targeting civilian and military infrastructure. In any event, it is highly likely that Washington and London will be closely involved in any further decision over the use of their missiles, and both countries are likely to take increased security measures to mitigate possible Russian hybrid responses.
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