Trend: Worsening
Al-Houthi cross-border attacks involving the use of weaponized drones and missiles will almost certainly continue to target the UAE in the short-to-medium term. The rebels have demonstrated their ability to repeatedly attack the UAE, particularly Abu Dhabi. Four Al-Houthi attacks have targeted the UAE in three weeks, suggesting that Al-Houthi cross-border attacks against the UAE could soon become a new norm.
Al-Houthi Capabilities
The Al-Houthis have continued to refine and evolve their weapons systems as the war in Yemen continues. The recent series of attacks against the UAE illustrates the Al-Houthis’ improved capabilities as the distance between Al-Houthi-controlled territory and the UAE is approximately 1,469 km (913 miles). The Al-Houthi rebels have both the means and the will to launch recurrent projectile attacks against Emirati territory.
To sustain their attacks, there is a high probability that a mature missile and drone assembly industry exists within Al-Houthi-controlled northern Yemen. To maintain this industry, the Al-Houthis combine Iranian-supplied guidance systems, drone engines, and fuel components with domestically available military hardware and imported dual-use materials, such as fiberglass. The Al-Houthis also receive near-continuous weapons shipments from Iran. The group claims to possess indigenously produced weaponized drones with ranges from 15 km (9 miles) to 1,500 km (930 miles), as well as theatre ballistic missiles (TBM) with ranges from 30 km (18 miles) to 1,200 km (746 miles).
Why Have These Attacks Begun Now against the UAE?
Despite withdrawing most of its troops from Yemen in 2019, the UAE retains significant influence within Yemen's south via proxy forces. Emirati proxy forces - the Giants Brigades - were the main factor in the defeat of the Al-Houthis in Yemen's Shabwah Governorate in January 2022. The loss of Ain, Usailan, and Bayhan districts was a major setback for the rebels. The territory had been taken as part of a more extensive Al-Houthi campaign to seize Ma'rib Governorate.
The battle for Ma'rib has been ongoing for nearly a year. Control over oil-rich Shabwah and Ma'rib are crucial economic components of any future Al-Houthi state. Moreover, Al-Houthi military success in both governorates would have ended President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi's hopes of retaining a meaningful power base within the country. The initial Al-Houthi attack on Jan. 17 was almost certainly retaliation for the sudden reversal of their military advances at the hands of the Emirati-backed Giants Brigades.
The Al-Houthi attacks cannot be examined in isolation from what is transpiring across the Middle East. The region is undergoing its most significant paradigm shift since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. US-Iran tensions continue despite the two countries’ indirect efforts to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iranian-aligned Shi’a militias continue to conduct attacks against Iraqi military bases housing US military personnel and diplomatic missions in Iraq.
The UAE, which experienced multiple maritime attacks off its coast during former US President Donald Trump’s term, is in the process of forging friendlier ties with Iran. The Gulf states, namely the UAE and Bahrain, are normalizing relations with Israel. At the same time, Israel and Iran appear to be intensifying covert actions against one another. Given Iran’s backing of the Al-Houthis, it is perhaps not coincidental that they targeted the UAE while the Israeli president was on an official state visit on Jan. 31.
The Iraq Factor – Feb. 2 Claim
Iraqi "ghost" militia Alwiyat al-Waad al-Haq (AWH) claimed responsibility for the Feb. 2 attack against the UAE. The militia is widely regarded as a cover organization for the Iran-backed Kata'ib Hizballah. Despite its Iraqi origin, AWH has yet to claim an attack on Iraqi soil; AWH appears instead to be focused on anti-Saudi and Emirati propaganda.
Iraqi militias allege the UAE interfered with the recent elections; AWH explicitly threatened to attack the UAE in the weeks leading up to the initial Jan. 17 attack. Information regarding AWH's claims is not readily available; however, if verified, it was likely an Iran-directed or, at the very least, an Iran-tolerated operation. AWH’s claims are indicative of closer cooperation between Iran’s regional proxies.
Is it Safe to Travel to the UAE?
The overall threat posed by Al-Houthi cross-border attacks remains largely limited. Despite the recent attacks, there is no increased risk to travelers to the UAE due to the Emirati military’s robust capacity for intercepting and destroying most projectiles; the Emirati military essentially possesses the same air defense systems and missile interceptors as Saudi Arabia.
The Emiratis also possess Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – or THAAD – systems. Saudi Arabia, which has been subject to near-constant cross-border Al-Houthi attacks since 2015, claims to intercept most, if not all, attacks; however, falling post-intercept debris remains a potentially lethal hazard. Possessing virtually identical air defense technology, the UAE will likely also intercept most cross-border aerial attacks.
But while the Emirati military will almost certainly mitigate the threat posed by additional Al-Houthi cross-border attacks, no air defense system is completely effective. Four attacks in three weeks suggest the Al-Houthis are applying their so-called balanced deterrence campaign when targeting the UAE. The campaign, a response to the Saudi-led coalition’s ongoing military involvement in Yemen, has traditionally targeted critical infrastructure, military bases, and airports within Saudi Arabia.
However, the repeat nature of the attacks against the UAE suggests the expansion of this policy to now include the country. The purpose of Al-Houthi cross-border projectile attacks is largely political: the Al-Houthis want to push the UAE toward accepting a political settlement vis-à-vis the war in Yemen that is beneficial to the rebel group. This apparent strategy is in stark contrast with the use of missiles and weaponized drones in Yemen itself, where the aim is maximum lethality.
Conclusion
It is unlikely that the Al-Houthis will cease their drone and missile attacks against the UAE in the immediate future. With no sign of the UAE withdrawing support for their proxies, no diplomatic solution on the table to end the war in Yemen, and with tensions between the Al-Houthis and the Saudi-led military coalition escalating, attacks may even intensify in the coming months.
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