Storm system Daniel struck northeastern Libya, including Benghazi, Susah, Al Bayda, and Derna, Sept. 9 triggering widespread flooding and damage. Years of civil war, and the absence of a central government, has left the population and infrastructure vulnerable to intense weather. The city of Derna was particularly affected as both dams in the Derna Valley were breached, releasing an estimated 30 million cubic meters of water into several neighborhoods and burying at least 25 percent of the city under mud. Reports indicate that at least 70 percent of Derna’s critical infrastructure and 50 percent of its roads were damaged. While it is difficult to accurately assess casualties, estimates indicate that between 4,000 and 11,300 people were killed and at least 9,000 were injured. Tens of thousands of others are still missing, and reports suggest that the death toll could reach 20,000. More than 48,000 people have been displaced across the affected region.
Unstable Political Situation Complicates Disaster Prevention and Response
As casualty numbers continue to rise, reports of government mismanagement have emerged. The political stalemate between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), backed by the House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, has been an aggravating factor in the prevention and the management of the disaster. In particular, years of government corruption have led to underinvestment in critical infrastructure, including the Derna dams. Despite a 2021 report from the Libyan State Audit Bureau stating that USD 1.3 million had been allocated to the upkeep of the dams, no repairs had been scheduled on the infrastructure since its construction in the 1970s. The Derna dams therefore did not meet the standards necessary to handle a major storm system and heavy rainfall.
Both the GNU and the GNS had been warned that Storm Daniel would reach the Libyan coast and that the infrastructure would not be able to protect the population. However, while a state of emergency was implemented, local officials, under the supervision of the GNS, implemented a curfew in Derna and other affected areas instead of heeding the advice of UN agencies to evacuate. These contradictory instructions led to additional confusion and accusations that officials effectively imprisoned the Derna population in houses in the danger zone. While both governments now appear to be working together, the presence of competing authorities on the ground is complicating the work of emergency services. In particular, the coordination of international aid, including aid workers from Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and other European nations, which have backed different governments during the conflict, is challenging.
Immediate Health Challenges
While rescue operations are ongoing, emergency personnel face daunting challenges. Providing medical assistance, water, and food to survivors in Derna has proven to be difficult, as the principal access route was heavily damaged in the storm. Several aid workers have been killed attempting to reach the city. Furthermore, floodwaters have shifted landmines and other explosive remnants of war, posing a significant risk to the population attempting to evacuate Derna and aid workers on the ground. Finally, accessing food and drinkable water is almost impossible. Contaminated water has already started causing additional casualties. World Health Organization (WHO) teams on the ground are attempting to prevent the spread of diseases due to contaminated water, notably cholera. Water stagnation and the presence of mass graves near watering sites is increasing the risk of outbreaks. The health threats are further complicated by infrastructural damage in the region: the only functioning hospital in Derna, after years of civil war, is now out of service.
The flooding has also displaced at least 48,000 people. As of April 2022, the city of Derna, with a pre-storm population of around 125,000, was already hosting 46,600 Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The former inhabitants of the affected area will now join these refugees moving around Libya to find refuge, which will put additional pressure on the host localities. The migration crisis will likely continue to worsen in the aftermath of the flooding, leading to security challenges in Libya but also in the Mediterranean Sea and Europe, as an increasing number of migrants will likely attempt to flee the disaster-stricken country. Authorities and aid workers on the ground will face increased hardship in meeting the needs of survivors and IDPs in areas affected by the storm. Water scarcity and food shortages will likely persist in the short term, especially as the collapsed dams have affected the agricultural sector in this previously fertile region. Authorities will need to address the damage to critical infrastructure and implement necessary measures to mitigate the risk of water scarcity and food shortages linked to climate change. Without those measures, the number of IDPs will continue to grow, putting pressure on crumbling local budgets and leading to growing frustration in the population.
Short-term security risks
A few days after Storm Daniel struck, the first reports of unrest emerged. On Sept. 18, hundreds of activists protested in front of Al Sahaba mosque in Derna, calling for an investigation into the collapse of the dams and demanding government accountability. Protesters reportedly burned down the mayor of Derna’s house. Mayor Abdulmenam al-Ghaithi is the focus of accusations of mismanagement, especially as his family’s link to Agila Saleh, HoR president, appears to highlight a pattern of corruption. Protesters have called for the dismissal of several members of the HoR, which they hold responsible for the scale of the disaster. On Sept. 19, a day after the protest, authorities in eastern Libya asked journalists to leave Derna and accused them of hampering the work of emergency personnel. Reports indicate that the same day, internet was cut, allegedly due to sabotage. It appears unlikely that local authorities and the GNS will demonstrate accountability for the mismanagement of the disaster, leading to further civil unrest. Violence could occur, particularly as Haftar-aligned security services are prone to crackdown on protests forcefully.
Additionally, competing armed militias continue to operate in eastern Libya, especially in disaster-stricken areas. As well as several Haftar and HoR-aligned groups, the GNU has deployed its 444 Brigade to assist emergency evacuations and aid workers. However, in the short term, the increased number of armed groups in the region could lead to further security challenges, especially as those from western Libya could be reluctant to depart once their emergency assistance is no longer needed. This situation could lead to territorial infighting, as militias attempt to consolidate areas under their control.
Long-term Political and Security Impact
The natural disaster that struck eastern Libya will have lasting political and security consequences. Due to reports of mismanagement and blatant corruption, the authority of the GNS and Haftar has been challenged in eastern Libya. Calls for representatives, including President Agila Saleh and other GNS ministers to resign have spread throughout the region. In the meantime, despite popular concerns, Haftar has nominated Saddam Haftar, his youngest son, to be head of the Disaster Response Committee and to handle the humanitarian response in Derna. Saddam Haftar has been accused of human rights abuses and embezzlement and his nomination has encouraged further – possibly irreversible – discontent, which could impact the political status quo in the long term. The GNS’ legitimacy when negotiating with the GNU and UN agencies on behalf of the population of Eastern Libya has been damaged. While it is unlikely the GNS will relinquish its hold on power, especially as Haftar continues to back the HoR, the reputational damage to both the GNS and HoR could alter the political landscape and impact discussions over a future unified government in Libya.
In particular, the changing political landscape will likely further complicate the establishment of elections. International and national stakeholders had previously been cautiously optimistic about the launch of a Libyan High-Level Panel for Elections (HLPE), which aimed to establish a legal framework and a roadmap for holding elections by the end of 2023. At the time, it was already unlikely that the GNS and GNU would follow the timeline. Now, such a goal seems unrealistic, especially considering that key obstacles to elections were the absence of security guarantees, the lack of political transparency, and the omnipresence of corruption. Therefore, the flooding, on top of destroying lives and critical infrastructure, has drastically hampered any hope of a swift resolution to the decades-long conflict and the political stalemate.
Conclusion
The sheer scale of the destruction and casualties in Eastern Libya is the immediate focus of international and local stakeholders, as they attempt to address the ongoing health and security challenges. However, the consequences of the flooding will lead to renewed short-and-long-term security threats and political difficulties. If authorities refuse to take responsibility for the damage, and provide necessary funds to restore critical infrastructure, growing anger could lead to a new wave of civil unrest. The damaged authority of the GNS and HoR could also reshape Libya’s political landscape and will likely hamper any hope of a swift and quick resolution to the conflict.
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