On April 4, authorities in Jordan revealed that they foiled an apparent plot by former Crown Prince Hamzah bin al-Hussein to undermine the monarchy with the help of unnamed “foreign” entities. Prince Hamzah was placed under house arrest and a dozen senior government and tribal leaders were also detained. This seismic political development has exposed the rifts within the country’s royal family. In two self-filmed videos, Prince Hamzah denied the charges; instead, he criticized the government for alleged pervasive corruption and incompetence. Concerns about political stability in the Hashemite Kingdom will persist, despite ensuing pledges of loyalty, and could provide an opportunity for the opposition and Islamists to more intensively and publicly focus their ire on King Abdullah II.
Tensions on Full Display
While tensions between King Abdullah II and Prince Hamzah are not new, they have never been this public. Former King Hussein bin Talal, who ruled Jordan from 1952 until his death in 1999, picked his oldest son, Abdullah, to succeed him. While Prince Hamzah – by all accounts – was being groomed for the throne, King Hussein thought he was too young to take over; Hamzah was 18 years old when King Hussein died. However, Abdullah II quickly made Hamzah the Crown Prince of Jordan to rally the entire family around him and mitigate tensions. In 2004, Abdullah removed Hamzah’s heir apparent designation and named his oldest son – Hussein – as the Crown Prince in 2009.
Implications of the Royal Schism
The events of April 3-4 have shocked the Jordanian public and raised concerns about political stability in Jordan, which has often appeared to be a relative citadel of stability in a region afflicted with seemingly endless conflict. The public dispute in the royal court involves tribal politics; Hamzah has cultivated ties with the “East Bankers,” who constitute the country’s traditional Bedouin tribes and are to be distinguished from the West Bank Palestinians. The bulk of the military and intelligence services are traditionally cultivated from among the East Bankers. Tensions between the two groups are persistent, but could further intensify if senior members of the royal family publicly take sides.
Hamzah is also believed to have upstaged King Abdullah II by not only meeting with tribal leaders but also visiting the families of six COVID-19 patients who recently died in Al Hussain New Salt Hospital due to oxygen shortages. Hamzah appears to have actively encouraged protests against government corruption. While protests are a common feature of Jordanian politics, they have rarely targeted the King and the royal court. However, should Hamzah continue publicly criticizing authorities, Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood, and opposition groups will likely feel emboldened to focus on King Abdullah II and his policies. The more insecure King Abdullah II feels, the more repressive his government will likely become in terms of curtailing individual and political freedoms.
On April 5, the royal court of Jordan released a letter from Prince Hamzah, pledging to remain loyal to both the King and the Constitution. While the rift appears currently mediated, the underlying disagreements between the King and former Crown Prince involving the management of the country’s economy and politics remain a concern. Hamzah’s criticism comes while Jordan is politically, economically, and socially vulnerable. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely damaged the Jordanian economy, which heavily relies on the tourism industry and foreign aid. Additionally, opposition groups and protest groups have regularly accused the government of economic mismanagement and corruption. Absent serious structural economic and political reforms, the government will likely face major social unrest, such as labor actions and protests, in the coming weeks.
Implications for the Business and Security Environment
While the language employed by Jordanian authorities implies a coup plot against King Abdullah II, there could be no successful attempt without the support of the country’s armed forces and intelligence services. Both the military and security services remain loyal to King Abdullah II and are unlikely to engage in any activity to harm the existing power structure in the country. In the short to medium term, King Abdullah II will likely reshuffle the government, ashe has previously done when public discontent grows. Such measures will likely trigger disruptions to business and public affairs.
