The rebel capture of Syria is now complete. Led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the insurgents launched their offensive against Aleppo on Nov. 27. Less than two weeks later, they seized control of several major cities, including Damascus on Dec. 8, from government forces. While HTS is credited with the rapid offensive that led to the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, several Islamist and opposition groups joined forces in the campaign. With the rebels now in control, the question remains whether they can maintain their unity and establish a government that is acceptable to all factions within the country. Meanwhile, neighboring countries are concerned about some of these groups due to their ties to extremist organizations. HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, now referred to by his followers as President Ahmed al-Shara, was once affiliated with al-Qaeda (AQ) and other militant organizations before severing ties with them in 2017. Regardless of how quickly HTS and its allies can establish a government, uncertainty and a volatile security situation will likely persist in the short-to-medium term.
What complicates the political and security landscape in Syria is the division of the country among various ethnic and religious groups, each with its own agenda and vision for governance. Additionally, these groups are supported by foreign powers whose economic and political interests in Syria often conflict. For instance, Türkiye has supported several opposition groups, including the Syrian National Army (SNA), which controls territory in northwestern Syria. The US, with multiple bases in Syria, is allied with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), primarily composed of Kurds, in northeastern Syria. Jordan has backed groups in southern Syria, and it was these southern forces that reached Damascus before HTS on Dec. 8. Gulf countries had provided support to opposition groups in the past but shifted their stance in 2020, recognizing Assad's likely survival. The United Arab Emirates, in particular, had sought to expand its ties with the Assad government. With the arrival of the Islamists in Damascus, however, Emirati leaders are watching closely. Meanwhile, the Islamic State (IS) remains active in eastern Syria, regularly launching attacks against civilians and government forces.
The regional impact of this new political configuration in Syria will lead neighboring countries to bolster their security, fearing militant groups may infiltrate their territories. Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan have already closed their borders with Syria. As HTS and its allies debate the future of Syria, several key issues need to be considered.
HTS and Abu Mohammad al-Jolani
Jolani remains a controversial and enigmatic figure. Born Ahmed Hussein al-Shara in 1982, he spent his early years in Saudi Arabia, where his father worked as an engineer. Jolani was radicalized during the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) in 2000 and later joined AQ to fight US forces in Iraq. He was also involved with IS in Syria before breaking ties with both groups. Now, Jolani presents himself as a "moderate" Muslim, advocating for an "Islam that aligns with the real world."
HTS was founded in 2011 under the name Jabhat al-Nusra as the Syrian branch of AQ, with assistance from former IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra severed ties with IS. In 2017, Jolani declared that the group had cut all external ties with AQ. Today, HTS claims to be “an independent entity that follows no organization or party, al-Qaeda or others.” However, the US government maintains that a link between the two groups exists, and HTS remains on the US terrorist watch list.
Challenges for Iran
Despite efforts by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shi'a al-Sudani refused to authorize the deployment of militias or resources to support Assad. The fall of Syria also hampers Iran's ability to support Lebanese Hizballah (LH), especially as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – US-backed Kurdish forces – captured Deir Ez-Zur Governorate, a crucial route for Iranian weapons smuggling into Syria and Lebanon. This has significantly disrupted Iran's critical lines of communication to Lebanon.
The Role of Türkiye
The Turks, who have supported the Syrian National Army (SNA), are largely credited with orchestrating the recent rebel offensive. While the SNA aligned itself with HTS in the assault against Assad’s forces in late November, it remains uncertain how much influence Türkiye will have over HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.
Potential Turkish Strategy
The shift in Syria’s power dynamics could benefit Türkiye, which may encourage its Sunni proxies to target Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria, aiming to seize more territory. Airstrikes in northern Syria were already reported on Dec. 9.
Israel's Concerns
Israel stands to gain from the changes in Syria’s geopolitical landscape but has increased security on its border and convened multiple emergency meetings. Israel's primary concerns involve the fate of Assad’s chemical and strategic weapons and how the rebels might manage them. Israel has continued to target such facilities, particularly given the fear that the LH could transfer these weapons to Lebanon for use against Israel. On Dec. 8, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the Israeli military would deploy in the demilitarized buffer zone along the Golan Heights, calling it a “temporary measure.” This move has been condemned by Jordan and Egypt, who perceive it as an attempt to fully occupy the Golan Heights.
Power Vacuum and the Rise of Militant Groups
Militant organizations, including IS and AQ, are likely to exploit any power vacuum created by the collapse of Assad's regime. HTS has previously clashed with both IS and AQ in Syria, and these groups are likely to continue fighting each other. Since its defeat as a territorial state in 2019, IS has largely remained confined to Syria’s remote Badia region but still conducts guerrilla-style attacks and occasional bombings in urban areas. A US-led coalition targeting IS remains in place, and US airstrikes against IS continue despite the collapse of the Assad government. These strikes will likely prevent IS from regaining significant territorial control, as it did in 2014.
