Loss of Russian Gas Shipments Spurs Internal and External Tensions in Moldova

The loss of Russian gas shipments through Ukraine places significant pressure on Moldova’s pro-EU government. President Maia Sandu and other political leaders accuse the Kremlin of seeking to plunge Moldova into an economic crisis ahead of the July 2025 parliamentary elections. Moscow likely aims to destabilize Chisinau with the ultimate goal of helping a more pro-Russian political leadership rise to power. Despite this significant challenge, central authorities in Moldova have thus far succeeded in preventing a severe gas shortage by declaring a state of emergency to reduce gas usage and acquire alternate hydrocarbon sources.

However, the same cannot be said for Transnistria, which implemented rolling blackouts and lost much of its ability to provide heat and hot water before reaching a deal to temporarily acquire Russian gas from alternate sources. Russian authorities blamed the shortages in Transnistria on Chisinau, while Russian state-owned gas provider Gazprom refused to route Transnistria-bound gas shipments through Moldova citing a disputed outstanding debt with Moldovagaz, a majority-owned Gazprom subsidiary, and Moldova’s primary energy company. Ultimately, Moldovan, Transnistrian, and Russian authorities agreed to supply three million cubic meters of gas to Transnistria from Feb. 1; however, a long-term supply agreement remains to be seen. 

Moscow has effectively demonstrated that it can turn a severe crisis in a close ally into a leverageable situation to exert pressure on Moldova. By reframing their position as an offer to provide humanitarian aid rather than a refusal to ship gas to Moldova, Russian authorities are likely seeking to inflame anti-Moldovan sentiment in Transnistria while compelling political actors in Moldova. Simultaneously, the severe blackouts experienced by Transnistria, coupled with the severe political strain this placed on Moldova, have proven to Moscow that it can successfully pressure the Moldovan political system by limiting gas to Transnistria.  

Additionally, while Moldova has largely succeeded in avoiding its own gas shortages, the energy situation in both Moldova proper and Transnistria could significantly deteriorate if the Cuciurgan Plant, Transnistria’s primary power station and a key energy source for Moldova as a whole, were to run out of gas in the future. Applying both humanitarian and economic pressures, Moscow may again cut off gas to Transnistria in the future in an attempt to extract political concessions from Chisinau.  

Beyond strengthened leverage over Moldova, Russian authorities are now deepening their political and economic control of Transnistria. While previous gas shipments to the breakaway region were effectively subsidized by Gazprom, the short-term resupply agreement will see Tiraspol purchase the gas using a Russian loan. Without significant revenue streams, the Transnistrian government will be unlikely to repay this or any similar future loans, allowing Russia to redefine its relationship with Transnistria from that of a patron state to that of a debtee. 

However, factors outside of both Chisinau’s and Moscow’s control continue to present an essential threat to Moldova and Transnistria’s ability to acquire Russian gas. Ukrainian authorities chose not to renew gas transit via the Druzhba Pipeline within the context of a broader campaign to undermine Russia’s war capabilities by depriving it of oil and gas revenues. Russian authorities subsequently reported that Ukrainian drones attacked the Russkaya Compression Station in southern Russia on Jan. 11; Russkaya is the compressor station on TurkStream, the last gas pipeline delivering Russian gas to Europe. Although Ukraine’s attack did not cause long-lasting damage to the compression station, it did prompt a temporary halt in TurkStream flows.  

While the loss of the line would effectively nullify Russia’s main leverage point over Moldova by neutralizing its ability to deliver gas in the future, the definitive loss of Russian gas would present a crucial political and economic challenge to Moldova. Notably, it remains unclear whether the Russian-backed leaders of Transnistria would accept non-Russian sources of gas; as a result, a successful Ukrainian attack on TurkStream would likely deepen the divide between Chisinau and Tiraspol. 

Political tensions between Moldova, Russia, and Transnistria will likely increase in the coming months despite the short-term revival of supplies to Tiraspol. Despite resuming gas flows to Transnistria, it is unlikely that Russia will agree to restore its supplies to Moldova proper. Russian authorities will likely again threaten to cut off Transnistrian gas after the stop-gap deal expires, and may again allow shortages to occur in order to extract additional concessions. A protracted period with a reduced gas supply will probably spur discontent within Moldova and exacerbate political tensions, leading to protests demanding an end to the crisis. Should a Ukrainian attack disable the TurkStream pipeline, tensions between Chisinau and Tiraspol could deepen further. 

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