Pakistani security forces monitor movement along the border with Afghanistan.
Twenty years after the devastating 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US-led military campaign that overthrew the Taliban’s first government, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan now drives the evolution of terrorism threats within the country. With their seizure of national political power, the Taliban has suddenly changed roles from being the country’s primary perpetrators of militant attacks to the de facto frontline security force meant to prevent them.
As per the 2020 bilateral agreement with Washington that led to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban agreed to cut ties with transnational terrorist groups and prevent them from using Afghanistan’s territory to threaten other countries. While the sincerity of this pledge is debatable, Taliban leadership has a clear interest in helping secure their position by preventing tensions with foreign powers and cracking down on in-country rivals. However, all previous Afghan governments since the late 1970s have been unable to effectively control all of Afghanistan’s territory, and if the Taliban administration faces similar challenges, it may be unable to prevent militant groups from using Afghanistan as a staging ground for attacks on foreign targets.
In-County Rivals
Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) is by far the most dangerous of the Taliban’s rivals. Although IS-K and the Taliban are both Islamist fundamentalist groups, the Taliban is also an Afghan nationalist movement that seeks to govern Afghanistan from its interpretation of Islamic doctrine. IS-K, on the other hand, is a transnational movement that seeks to dissolve existing borders and unite the global Muslim population under its rule.
IS-K and the Taliban have fought since 2015, and their violent antagonism is almost certain to continue. IS-K militants in Afghanistan will attempt additional suicide bombings, along with shooting and rocket attacks, targeting Taliban fighters, foreign nationals, and Afghan religious minorities. IS-K’s mass casualty attack on the international airport in Kabul on August 26 underscored the group’s continued threat within Afghanistan.
The estimated 1,500 - 2,000 IS-K militants in Afghanistan will seek to expand their support and membership by condemning the Taliban-led administration as “soft” and “insincere.” Whether such efforts are successful depends largely on the Taliban’s ability to reconcile competing interests and effectively govern Afghanistan.
Central Asia Wary of Militancy
Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are concerned about the potential spread of Islamist militancy across their borders, and they are enhancing security cooperation with Russia as a precaution. Taliban leadership has tried to reassure these neighboring countries and Moscow of their peaceful and cooperative intentions.
Nevertheless, the Taliban has historic ties with Islamist militants who fought in Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war. Even if the top Taliban leadership does not intend to antagonize Russia and its former Soviet partners, some Taliban commanders likely sympathize with Central Asian Islamist militants. Meanwhile IS-K could attempt to stage attacks and garner support in the region.
Cross-Border Threat to Pakistan
Pakistani officials are also wary of potential militant threats from Afghanistan. In addition to IS-K, Pakistan must contend with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ethnic Balochi separatist groups, especially the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The TTP is an organizationally distinct group from the Afghan Taliban. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, the TTP does not recognize the Afghan-Pakistan border and, instead of having covert ties with Pakistani intelligence, the TTP is openly opposed to the Pakistani government.
However, distinctions between the Afghan Taliban and TTP are much less clear in Pashtun-dominated areas along the Pakistani frontier; many individuals and some commanders have fought in both groups at various times. The TTP may seek to increase the frequency of attacks on Pakistani security forces in and around Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province following the victory of the Afghan Taliban.
Meanwhile, Pakistani leaders may believe that the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan decreases the threat of militancy in its far western province of Balochistan. The Pakistani government frequently accused Indian and Afghan intelligence agencies of using Afghan territory to provide haven and support to ethnic Balochi separatists fighting in Balochistan – support meant to counter Islamabad’s ties to the Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri militants.
Unlike the previous Afghan government, which had friendly relations with India and deep tensions with Islamabad, the Taliban has no apparent motive to support Balochi separatism. Nevertheless, some degree of militant activity, including shooting and bombing attacks against Pakistani security forces and Chinese-backed development projects, will likely continue in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province.
Regional Militancy Outlook
Taliban motives, cohesion, and capabilities will largely determine the extent and nature of Afghanistan’s domestic and cross-border terrorist threats. The group’s leadership likely wants to avoid antagonizing Afghanistan’s neighbors and other foreign powers by providing overt support to international militants.
However, some Taliban commanders probably remain sympathetic to foreign Islamist movements, and they may be inclined to provide some level of tactical support. Within Afghanistan, further IS-K attacks are highly likely in the short term. In the long run, the Taliban needs to ensure adequate security, competent governance, and sufficient economic activity to reduce internal and international militant threats.
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